Date |
Topic |
Reading
orange=optional
|
Handouts & assignments |
The Russellian view of meaning: motivations and problems
|
| Tuesday, January 15 |
The theory of reference |
none |
The theory of reference
Why a theory of reference is not a theory of meaning |
| Thursday, January 17 |
Intensions & possible worlds semantics; the Kaplan semantics for indexicals |
Kaplan, "Demonstratives"
Lewis, "General semantics" |
Introduction to possible worlds semantics
Indexicality & double-indexing |
Tuesday, January 22
Thursday, January 24 |
Fregean semantics and its problems |
Frege, "On sense and reference"
Frege, "On concept and object"
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lectures I & II |
Introduction to Fregean semantics
5 problems for Fregean semantics |
Tuesday, January 29
Thursday, January 31
|
Russell's early theory of propositions; three problems for Russell's early theory
King's neo-Russellian theory of propositions |
Russell, Principles of Mathematics Ch. IV
Russell, "On the nature of truth and falsehood"
King, NSOC pp. 6-24
King, NSOC ch. 2 |
Russell's early theory of propositions and its discontents
Russell, King and the problem of the unity of the proposition
A sketch of two theories of propositions |
Tuesday, February 5
Thursday, February 7
|
Russellianism & the problem of empty names |
Braun, "Empty names"
Soames, Appendix on empty names
van Inwagen, "Creatures of fiction"
Braun, "Empty names, mythical names, fictional names"
Salmon, "Nonexistence"
Jeshion, Donnellan on Neptune" |
The problem of empty names
What can a Millian say about empty names? |
Tuesday, February 12
Thursday, February 14
|
"Existentialism" and Plantinga's problem |
Plantinga, "On existentialism"
David, "Defending existentialism?"
Prior, "The possibly-true and the possible"
Adams, "Actualism and thisness"
Williamson, "Necessary existents"
Nelson & Fitch, "Singular propositions" |
Plantinga's argument against existentialism
David, Buridan, and existentialism defended (! not ?)
Existentialism and truth conditions for modal propositions |
Tuesday, February 19
Thursday, February 21
|
Presentism & Russellianism |
Markosian, "A Defense of Presentism"
Sider, "Presentism and ontological commitment"
Crisp, "Presentism and the grounding objection"
Crisp, "Presentism and cross-time relations"
Brogaard, "Tensed relations" |
The conflict between existentialism and presentism
Options for the existentialist who is also a serious presentist |
Tuesday, February 26
Thursday, February 28 |
Frege's puzzle |
Kripke, "A puzzle about belief"
Salmon, "How to become a Millian heir"
Soames, Beyond Rigidity (selection)
Caplan, "Millian descriptivism"
Fodor, "Substitution arguments and the individuation of beliefs" |
Frege's problem(s) and the Fregean solutions
Conciliatory vs. unrepentant Millianism |
| March 4 & 6: spring break |
The foundations of meaning
|
| Tuesday, March 11 |
Semantics, pragmatics, & Millianism, one last time |
none |
The problem of conflicting restrictions
An argument against descriptive Millianism |
Thursday, March 13
Tuesday, March 18 |
The problem of the foundations of meaning |
Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (excerpt)
Soames, "Skepticism about meaning: normativity, indeterminacy, and the rule-following paradox" |
Kripke's skeptical paradox
More replies to Kripke's problem |
| Thursday, March 20 |
Class cancelled |
| Tuesday, March 25 |
Is meaning normative? |
none |
The normativity of content and "the Frege point" |
Thursday, March 27
Tuesday, April 1 |
Mentalist theories I: Intention |
Grice, "Utterer's meaning and intention"
Grice, "Meaning"
Borg, "Intention-based semantics"
|
Grice on meaning, speaker-meaning, and intention
Davis' neo-Gricean theory
An alternative view of the relationship between meaning and speaker-meaning |
Tuesday, April 3
Tuesday, April 8 |
Mentalist theories II: Belief |
Lewis, "Languages and Language" |
Explaining the disquotational principle
Lewis on convention and meaning |
Thursday, April 10
Tuesday, April 15
Thursday, April 17
|
Use theories of meaning |
Horwich, "A use theory of meaning" |
Horwich's use theory of meaning
Two kinds of supervenience |
Tuesday, April 22
|
Introduction vs. transmission of meaning |
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lectures I & II |
Sketch of a theory of meaning |
| Random end of semester topics |
| Thursday, April 24 |
Vagueness |
none |
Solutions to the sorites paradox |
| Tuesday, April 29 |
Context-sensitivity |
none |
How do I tell whether an expression is an indexical? |