

# Varieties of intentionalism

PHIL 93507

Jeff Speaks

August 31, 2009

I introduced intentionalism as the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on content. But this is a simplification. Intentionalist theories vary on at least four dimensions:

1. *Local vs. global*. Whether the supervenience thesis is supposed to hold for all states with a phenomenal character, or just for some proper subset of those states (for example, for perceptual experiences but not for bodily sensations).
2. *Intramodal vs. intermodal*. Whether the supervenience thesis is supposed to hold for pairs of experiences of different sense modalities, or just for (for example) pairs of visual experiences, or pairs of olfactory experiences.
3. *Time-restricted intrapersonal vs. time-unrestricted intrapersonal vs. interpersonal*. Whether the supervenience thesis is supposed to hold for pairs of experiences had by arbitrary subjects, or only for experiences of a single subject, or only for experiences of a single subject within a certain restricted time interval.
4. *Conditional vs. biconditional*. Whether the claim is just that phenomenology supervenes on content, or the conjunction of this claim with the claim that content supervenes on phenomenology.

While there are obvious entailment relations within each of these dimensions — in each case they are listed from weakest to strongest — there are no obvious entailment relations across these four dimensions.

Let's set aside the last dimension for now. The first three dimensions give us 12 different intentionalist theses, the entailment relations between which are represented by the unwieldy chart on back.

It will be useful to keep these separate, since some arguments count against some versions of intentionalism, but not against others.

