Philosophy 93507: Perception
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Topic
This will be a course on the nature of phenomenal properties, like those that subjects instantiate when they have typical perceptual experiences and bodily sensations. We will investigate the prospects for a reduction of phenomenal properties to representational properties, and a reduction of representational properties to functional properties or other physicalistically-acceptable properties. Some of the reading here will be from a book ms. of mine on the topic, though, fortunately for students, there will be other readings as well.
Format
The course meets in 220 Malloy on Mondays, from 9:00-11:30. The course is a seminar rather than a lecture. Students are welcome, but not required, to present their work to the class at any time during the semester.
Texts
All of the readings will be made available in PDF form via links from the syllabus.
Assignments
Everyone taking the course for a grade will write a term paper. The paper should approximate a journal article. Just as there are many kinds of journal articles, there can be many sorts of term papers. The paper could, for example, be a very short Analysis-style paper, or it could be a longer piece which gets heavily into the literature on your chosen topic. It (hopefully) goes without saying that the papers must be clear, well-argued, and make an original contribution to the subject you're discussing. I'm very happy to read drafts of term papers, or drafts of fragments of term papers.
Date |
Topic |
Reading |
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Monday, January 23 |
[class canceled] |
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Monday, January 30 |
What is perceptual content?
What is phenomenal character? |
MS., Ch. 1
Siegel, The Content of Visual Experience (excerpt)
extra readings ↓
extra readings ↑
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Monday, February 6 |
Varieties of intentionalism; the transparency of experience; an argument for interpersonal intramodal intentionalism |
MS., Chs. 2-8
Block, "Sexism, racism, ageism, and the nature of consciousness"
Byrne, "Intentionalism defended"
extra readings ↓
extra readings ↑
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Monday, February 13 |
More on the time and memory constraints; nonconceptual content and intermodal intentionalism |
MS., Chs. 9-12
Thompson, "Senses for senses"
extra readings ↓
extra readings ↑
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Monday, February 20 |
Fregeanism vs. Russellianism about perceptual content; Fregeanism about the content of thought |
MS., Ch. 13
Tye, "Nonconceptual content, richness, and fineness of grain"
Roskies, "A new argument for nonconceptual content"
Johnston, "The obscure object of hallucination"
extra readings ↓
extra readings ↑
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Monday, February 27 |
Perceptual representation & availability for thought; arguments against the availability requirement; perceptual representation of objects |
MS., Chs. 14-15
Siegel, "Which properties are represented in perception?"
Tye, "The admissible contents of visual experience"
extra readings ↓
extra readings ↑
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Monday, March 5 |
Independence and fallibility; perceptual representation of properties: natural kinds, appearance property-ism, color relativism |
MS., Ch. 19
Cohen, The Red and the Real (excerpt)
Shoemaker, "Phenomenal character"
extra readings ↓
extra readings ↑
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Spring break |
Monday, March 19 |
Wrapping up spectrum inversion; issues in the metaphysics of propositions: unity, modality, and indexicality |
MS., Chs. 20-23
Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (excerpt)
Plantinga, "On existentialism"
Perry, "The problem of the essential indexical"
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Monday, March 26 |
Phenomenal relations; distinctions between the senses and bodily sensation types |
MS., Chs. 24-26
O'Callaghan, "Crossmodal illusions"
extra readings ↓
extra readings ↑
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Monday, April 2 |
Attention and aspect switches; three views of the relationship between phenomenal and representational properties |
MS., Ch. 27 & Ch. 28
Nickel, "Against intentionalism"
Macpherson, "Ambiguous figures and the content of experience"
extra readings ↓
extra readings ↑
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Easter break |
Monday, April 16 |
Phenomenal content |
MS., Chs. 31-34
Phillips, "Indiscriminability and experience of change"
Hawthorne & Kokavich, "Disjunctivism"
Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (ch. 4)
Graff Fara, "Phenomenal continua and the sorites"
De Clerq & Horsten, "Perceptual indiscriminability: in defence of Wright's proof"
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Monday, April 23 |
Indistinguishable phenomenal properties; functionalist theories of phenomenal properties; theories of content |
MS., Ch. 35-8
Tye, Consciousness, Color, and Content
Byrne ,"Don't PANIC"
Pautz, "Do theories of consciousness rest on a mistake?" |
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Monday, April 30 |
Distinguishing phenomenal and non-phenomenal relations;distinctions between phenomenal relations; biological theories of content |
Putnam, "Psychological predicates"
Pautz, "Why consciousness cannot just be in the head"
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May 7 |
Term papers due |
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Grading
The midterm exam and (non-cumulative) final exam will each be worth 35% of the final grade; short take home assignments will, collectively, be worth 10%. The remaining 20% of the final grade will be given on the basis of class attendance and participation.
Each assignment is required, in the sense that failure to complete one or more assignments is sufficient to fail the course.
Notre Dame has no official way of indexing numerical grades to letter grades. This is the system that will be used in this course:
A |
94+ |
A- |
90-93 |
B+ |
87-89 |
B |
83-86 |
B- |
80-82 |
C+ |
77-79 |
C |
73-76 |
C- |
70-72 |
D |
60-69 |
F |
59- |
Honor code
In all of their assignments, students are responsible for compliance with the University’s honor code, information about which is available
here. You should acquaint yourself with the policies and penalties described there.
Sometimes, it can be hard to know what, exactly, the honor code implies with respect to different disciplines. For this reason, the philosophy department has prepared a document explaining, using examples, what the honor code requires of students when writing a philosophy paper. I strongly recommend that you read this document, which is available
here. It is possible to violate the honor code without intending to do so; the best way to avoid this is to carefully read through the philosophy department's guidelines.
If you are in doubt about what the honor code requires of you in a particular case, please ask me.